Romania’s EEZ Sees Russian “Ghost Fleet” Activity Amid Sanctions

Economic Zone Analysis Reveals Russian “Ghost Fleet” Activity

A third of the Russian-flagged vessels that have conducted ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in Romania’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) since the Ukraine war began are sanctioned by various jurisdictions worldwide. All sanctions were imposed in 2025, and none of the targeted vessels have reported an STS operation after their implementation, according to a 45North analysis based on information provided by the Romanian Naval Authority.

Between May 14, 2022, and February 15, 2026, over 700 such operations were reported in Romania’s EEZ, with an estimated volume of 4-5 million metric tons of petroleum products valued at billions of dollars, according to the analysis.

Russian “Ghost Fleet” Activity

This analysis comes amid concerns about Russia’s use of the STS transfer method to evade international sanctions. In October 2025, 45North reported on a tanker vessel called TULU, with IMO number 9313462, navigating under the Barbados flag and remaining in Romania’s EEZ for nearly a year, from 2024 to 2025. During this period, it participated in multiple STS transfers that could have involved the offloading or loading of Russian oil products, many of which do not appear in the ANR report.

According to data provided by the Romanian Naval Authority and analyzed by 45North journalists, these transfers were conducted by over 400 vessels flying 42 different flags, with the most popular being Liberia (69), Panama (67), Palau (43), Russia (35), and the Marshall Islands (22).

Sanctions and Russian Vessels

“We analyzed the vessels registered under the Russian flag more closely. Of course, among the remaining 414 vessels, there are many examples where the ultimate owner is of Russian origin or under Russian control. However, we chose these 35 vessels because none of them have used a method to conceal their identity at the time they entered Romania’s EEZ.

Of these 35 vessels, only 10 are currently under sanctions in one or more jurisdictions, with none sanctioned earlier than 2025. This indicates the reactive nature of sanctions. None of these vessels has reported an STS operation after the implementation of sanctions,” the analysis shows.

Context

These findings are relevant to understanding, in part, the ecosystem used by Russia and other states to evade international sanctions. “STS transfers represent a standard and regulated logistical instrument in maritime oil transport, governed by recognized international procedures, but they are also recognized as a high-risk tactic for evading price ceilings because they can disrupt traceability and facilitate ‘washing’ of the cargo by combining illicit petroleum products with those from legitimate sources.”

As 45North notes, none of the vessels included in the ANR report was sanctioned until 2025, marking the point at which no further STS operations were reported.

It is difficult to estimate how many such transfers occur without being reported to competent authorities. For example, Tommy, a vessel currently navigating under the Guinea-Bissau flag, appears involved in 48 unique STS events. However, an analysis from October 2025 by 45North revealed that the same vessel was implicated in 67 STS operations during the period July 2024-June 2025, some of which do not appear in the ANR report.

In this context, it is important to note that at least with regard to Russian vessels, a significant part of recent international sanctions imposed on Russia have been reactive.

Original Article: Analiză 45North: Cum au devenit apele românești terenul de joacă al „flotei fantomă” a Rusiei / Peste trei ani de transferuri de produse petroliere de la navă la navă în Zona Economică Exclusivă a Rom — Info-Sud-Est (Romanian) | View English Translation