Grasping the Hem of the Cloak
Active confrontation of the shadow fleet by European and, more recently, EU navies, combined with sanctions and intelligence sharing, has succeeded in drawing the fleet at least partially out of the shadows. European pressure to delist fraudulent vessels through cooperation with flag states has also opened cracks in an elaborate façade of shell companies, dubious insurance, and opaque ownership. European navies, including those operating under the EU’s IRINI and Atalanta naval missions, have successfully invoked UNCLOS (especially Article 110), to board and investigate vessels sailing without a valid flag.
Russia’s Shift in Tactics
Russia’s approach has shifted in two clear ways in 2026. The first is its decision to list shadow fleet vessels under its own registry. While in the past, Moscow preferred a form of deniability, actions against the shadow fleet have forced it to take a more active role in securing this economic lifeline. This was vividly demonstrated in January 2026 when the Bella 1/Marinera was relisted mid-voyage as a Russian-flagged ship while being pursued across the Atlantic by US naval vessels. Russia even sent a submarine and naval vessels to protect the Bella 1, but they arrived too late. Nevertheless, the move signalled Russia’s willingness to deploy military assets against the US navy in defence of its flagged ships. A similar pattern has subsequently played out in various European waterways, notably in the Gulf of Finland and the English Channel, where Russian warships now routinely accompany shadow fleet vessels to deter potential boarding.
The Militarisation of the Shadow Fleet
The second shift is the growing militarisation of the shadow fleet. In June 2026, Estonian authorities reported seeing machine guns mounted on the deck of a shadow fleet vessel as it sailed through Estonian waters. The militarisation of Russian-linked tankers is not new, but the clear visibility of the weaponry was likely designed as a deterrent. This signals a longer-term shift towards using shadow fleet vessels not simply to transport oil but also as military assets.
A Dual Purpose
The fleet has long served a dual purpose in Russia’s hybrid war against Europe. It has been closely linked to a series of cable-cutting incidents in 2024 and 2025. Shadow fleet vessels have also been closely linked to a wave of drone sightings in 2025-26, providing platforms from which drones could be launched. These drone sightings caused significant disruption at military and civilian facilities alike and likely served to test EU and NATO responses to such attacks.
Adding a Trident to the Toolbox
The aim in combating the shadow fleet must remain to remove ageing and dangerous vessels from European waters and prevent them from transporting their cargo to fund the Russian war machine. Europeans should bear in mind that Russia’s shadow fleet continues to stretch the limits of international law, especially in terms of militarisation and dual use of civilian assets. Efforts to curb the trade in oil and petroleum products should therefore also extend to include the fight against Russian weapons smuggling and future LNG trading.
The EU and its Member States could explore three additional tools, although an ‘all of the above’ toolbox will likely yield the best results. Firstly, most boarding efforts currently hinge on UNCLOS Article 110, which allows for the right of visit and search. Secondly, European authorities should consider imposing stricter regulations on vessel registration and ownership to prevent fraudulent activities. Finally, there is a need to develop new ways to counter evolving sanctions-evasion techniques and brace for more direct confrontation.
Original Article: Out of the shadows and into the fire: Next steps in fighting Russia’s shadow fleet — Europa