Russian Vessels Utilize AIS Manipulation to Conceal Military Materiel Delivery to Tartus
After withdrawing significant military assets from Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad at the end of 2024, Russia appears interested in reestablishing its historical foothold in the port of Tartus. Here is a recent case study illustrating how Russia is using sanctioned commercial vessels to deliver military matériel to the port, and how Automatic Identification System (AIS) manipulation is used in an attempt to conceal the activity.
Two sanctioned Russian vessels and a naval replenishment oiler set sail from Baltic ports in April 2026, bound for Tartus, Syria. The sanctioned Russian-flagged oil products tanker General Skobelev (IMO 9503304), sanctioned cargo vessel Sparta (IMO 9268710), and replenishment oiler Akademik Pashin (IMO 9778193) departed from Saint Petersburg, Kaliningrad, and Murmansk, respectively, on April 15, 18, and 23. They were under the escort of the Gorshkov-class frigate Admiral Kasatonov, declaring Port Said, Egypt as their destination.
NATO Navies Monitor Russian Convoy
On April 15, General Skobelev departed Saint Petersburg, Russia, sailing south to Kaliningrad, where it joined with the Sparta – one of the sanctioned Oboronlogistics-operated vessels. NATO navies began monitoring the convoy as it transited the Baltic Sea. The convoy was then followed in the English Channel by the Dutch Navy’s DSS Galatea and the UK Royal Navy’s RFA Tideforce to monitor the convoy’s movements.
AIS Signals Manipulated
Meanwhile, the Russian replenishment oil tanker Akademik Pashin transited south from the North Sea, joining the convoy as it passed Dover Strait on 23 April. The same day, the Russian Gorshkov-class frigate Admiral Kasatonov took over as the primary escort through the Channel.
Satellite imagery acquired west of Portugal on 26 April confirmed the convoy’s position in the Atlantic, possibly capturing General Skobelev, Sparta, Akademik Pashin, and Admiral Kasatonov still sailing together in close formation. After passing the English Channel, General Skobelev and Akademik Pashin likely turned off their AIS on April 24. Sparta’s AIS signals appeared until April 26 before possibly going dark.
Convoy Reappears on AIS Trackers
As the convoy went through the Strait of Gibraltar, they briefly reappeared on AIS trackers. Once through the strait, both vessels possibly went dark again.
In addition, on May 1 at 13:36 UTC, General Skobelev’s AIS appears to have been spoofed, showing its position near Estonia. Similarly, on May 8, Sparta’s AIS signal showed it in Kaliningrad while broadcasting a speed of 49.8 knots, far beyond the capability of a vessel of its size.
Convoy Approaches Tartus
Two days later, satellite imagery captured all four vessels southwest of Malta in international waters, heading east into the Mediterranean. Satellite imagery shows the movements of the convoy on the south coast of Crete, Greece, as well as the Admiral Kasatonov likely operating north of Tartus, confirming the convoy was approaching its true destination.
The first confirmed imagery of the convoy at Tartus was acquired on May 11. Images from May 13 appear to confirm Sparta, General Skobelev, Akademik Pashin, the Russian Navy Altay-class oil tanker Yelnya, and the bulk carrier Akson Serin all at berth. The exact cargo is unknown, though Sparta has historically functioned as a core asset for moving military logistics assets.
After eleven days, satellite imagery acquired southeast of Spain pictured the Sparta, General Skobelev, Yelnya, and corvette Stoikiy sailing together on the return voyage westbound, with a fifth vessel, potentially identified as Admiral Kasatonov, also present.
Original Article: Russia’s “Syria Express” Convoys May Be Combining Multiple AIS Tricks — The Maritime Executive